You're all cordially invited to join us for another one of a series of monthly interactive forums with the public (as I've held since November 2003) tomorrow, Tues. Oct. 27th at 5:30 pm at Rhinebeck Town Hall at 80 E. Market St:
"Election Integrity, The Independent Dutchess Energy Alliance, and Zero-Waste Dutchess: An Update"!...
Guest speakers for the evening include Rhinebeck's Andi Novick, cofounder of the Election Transparency Coalition and a recognized leader across the country on voting integrity. Last December I worked with Andi Novick to get the Dutchess County Legislature to unanimously pass a resolution in support of keeping lever voting machines here-- the NYS Association of Towns soon followed suit, along with the InterCounty Legislative Legislative Committee of the Adirondacks, and Ulster, Sullivan, Greene, Columbia, Chenango, Cortland, Delaware, Essex, Fulton, Herkimer, Montgomery, Rensselaer, Schoharie, Schuyler, Tioga, Warren, Washington, Wyoming counties as well...(even Westchester Co. Leg.'s signed on to letter on this too!)..
HBO (with its documentary "Hacking Democracy") proved conclusively several years ago that even paper-ballot optical scan voting machines are just about as hackable as touchscreen/DRE machines:
http://www.HackingDemocracy.com ; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hursti_Hack ;
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0505/S00381.htm ;
http://www.wikihow.com/video/wht/213254/how-to-hack-michigan's-optical-scanner-voting-machines ...
The fact is, as Andi Novick has proven conclusively, that the Help America Vote Act does not mandate a switch from the current lever machines we use to computerized voting machines; see:
http://nylevers.wordpress.com/ ; http://www.ElectionDefenseAlliance.org ...
Also speaking tomorrow night at this forum will be David Dell of Poughkeepsie-- Sustainable Hudson Valley Chair, updating us all re: progress on the Independent Dutchess Energy Alliance-- and one billion dollars potentially in savings on electric bills over ten years for Dutchess homeowners and businesses if we truly follow successful green jobs/retrofits example of Cambridge, MA...
[see http://www.CambridgeEnergyAlliance.org and Town of Babylon's http://www.LIGreenHomes.com ]
Again-- credit goes to Co. Leg.'s Tom Mansfield, Pete Wassell, Bill McCabe, and Marge Horton on this too-- and team I brought together to make this happen; I facilitated many meetings last year to get IDEA nonprofit off the ground; it's finally happening. I brought together these folks to create IDEA-- Lucy Johnson of Vassar College's Sustainability Committee, Allison Morrill Chatrchyan of Cornell Cooperative Extension of Dutchess County's Environmental Program, David Dell of Sustainable Hudson Valley, Stuart Findlay of the Cary Institute of Ecosystem Studies, Zywia Wojnar of the Pace University Energy & Climate Center, Larry Steele of our county's Environmental Management Council,
John Morgan of Rhinebeck Savings Bank, and many more from Marist like Steve Sansola, Tom Lynch and folks like Laurie Husted from Bard as well...
Finally, I will also be taking a portion of the evening tomorrow to share my PowerPoint from his Green Ribbon zero waste report for Dutchess County (thx much to Vassar Sustainability Committee Intern Nadine Souto for much help/work on this)...
[see: http://www.poughkeepsiejournal.com/assets/pdf/BK142669916.PDF -- comments from 36 Dutchess residents signed on already for zero-waste approach: http://www.petitiononline.com/zeroyes
see http://www.350.org and http://www.StopTrashingtheClimate.org for much more on these last two]
Click on this link for more detail on nine different studies proving computer voting machines hackable:
http://nylevers.wordpress.com/chart/resources-background-links/faqs/computer-scientists-agree-software-based-election-systems-cannot-be-made-secure-from-undetectable-manipulation-or-er ; more below.
Hope to see you all there tomorrow!...
Joel
242-3571/876-2488
joeltyner@earthlink.net
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From: Andinovick@aol.com
Date: Sat, 24 Oct 2009 11:30:35 EDT
Subject: This Tuesday, October 27th- Rhinebeck Town Hall or Your Vote Will Not Counted
Dear friends of transparent elections,
I have been invited by Rhinebeck/Clinton County Legislator Joel Tyner to speak at Rhinebeck's Town Hall, this Tuesday night, October 27th, 5:30 80 East Market Street. I will be discussing where we're at in our efforts to stop voting from becoming a "useless formality." I am hopeful we'll be in court next month and stop the State's plan to implement concealed vote counting on faith-based computers cloaked with an illusory post-election audit procedure.
This week's Columbia Paper totally got it right in its editor's editorial: WHAT IF YOUR VOTE didn't count?
"counting any votes electronically with currently available technology is a prescription for gutting the democratic process. And if our votes don't count, then nothing else we do as citizens matters."
"This isn't a partisan issue. Republicans, Democrats, independents and minor party voters all have a stake in knowing their votes have been counted. But there is big money in the changeover to electronic voting systems, and politicians have shown a surprising reluctance to admit that the law requiring them is a grave mistake."
"Ms. Martin has recently testified before state lawmakers, explaining to them that this type of computer voting is so deeply flawed that it's doubtful elections officials would ever know whether votes have been properly tabulated or even recorded at all."
Columbia County Election Commissioner Martin has shown enormous integrity and courage- and she's just doing her job! I attended this Thursday's Assembly Hearing in which some of our representatives on the panel expressed their shock, disapproval (and unwittingly- their ignorance) in response to Commissioner Martin's testimony that she could not in good conscience certify the accuracy of election results she had no basis for knowing were accurate and would not do so. I left the hearing in disgust rather than staying to testify. It appeared from the remarks made by certain assembly members that testifying would become still another 'useless formality.' If our government doesn't understand the basic principles of democracy- we're NOT SUPPOSED TO TRUST GOVERNMENT- we're supposed to be eternally vigilant- they're not going to accept responsibility for the grave mistake they made in enacting a law that mandates critical steps of the electoral process be concealed.
Useless formality is how NY's court described a voting system that didn't permit every step to be observed both by election officials and public observers. That's why we have to go to court.
Columbia County has also "launched a vigorous outreach effort to familiarize people with disabilities and poll workers with the systems. It may be the most extensive program of its kind in the state." Printed below the editorial is the front page article, also from Columbia's Paper, describing Columbia County's efforts: "the county may have placed itself far ahead of the pack in reaching out to voters who may need the accessible voting devices."
Thanks
Hope to see you Tuesday night.
Andi Novick
Founder and Legal Counsel, the Election Transparency Coalition
More people have been elected between sundown and sunup than ever were elected between sunup and sundown. Will Rogers
Today's Columbia
E-voting imperils basic right
Written by PARRY TEASDALE
Friday, 23 October 2009
WHAT IF YOUR VOTE didn't count? Forget about Afghanistan, it's happened plenty of places in the U.S.--take Florida, for instance. And it could happen right here in Columbia County.
When voters go to the polls Tuesday, November 3, most will still use the same old, bulky, mechanically operated booths with their satisfying metallic rattle that announces another set of votes has been recorded.
But somewhere in each of the 58 polling stations in Columbia County is a new, electronic system, part of which is called a ballot marking device. It allows people with all sorts of disabilities that might prevent them from using the mechanical machines to cast their ballots at a public voting site rather than use a paper ballot or forgo voting altogether.
The availability of ballot marking technology represents real progress, but in the last election only 14 people used the expensive systems. To their great credit, the county election commissioners did not blame that low usage on the machines; instead, they recognized the need to train poll workers and voters how the systems work. Commissioners Virginia Martin, a Democrat, and Don Kline, a Republican, have launched a vigorous outreach effort to familiarize people with disabilities and poll workers with the systems. It may be the most extensive program of its kind in the state.
The county plans to use the new marking device to record the ballots of each voter who uses one of the devices; election officials will count the ballots later by hand. That's a good use of the technology. But ballot marking is only half of what the devices can do. They also offer a computer-driven "optical scan" of the marked ballots--a form of electronic voting, where the system records the votes. That's where the county has drawn the line.
Ms. Martin has recently testified before state lawmakers, explaining to them that this type of computer voting is so deeply flawed that it's doubtful elections officials would ever know whether votes have been properly tabulated or even recorded at all.
On election night, local officials in this county will open the back of each mechanical voting machine and call out the number of votes cast at each lever. If questions come up later, the numbers are right there to review. But where electronic systems are used, there is no way for officials to "open" the computers and check for meltdowns or fraud, because the makers of the computer voting software keep their programs a secret. In other words, only the manufacturer has a realistic chance of knowing whether something has gone awry, and the company has no incentive to admit that its devices screwed up. And experts say even the company might not be able to detect a problem.
Electronically marked ballots are a boon to those who might otherwise face huge barriers when it comes to exercising their right to vote. But counting any votes electronically with currently available technology is a prescription for gutting the democratic process. And if our votes don't count, then nothing else we do as citizens matters.
Ms. Martin and Mr. Kline have been consistent and vocal opponents of federal and now state initiatives to prevent voters from using proven mechanical voting machines. They have raised their voices against the unreliable electronic systems that benefit nobody but the companies that make the devices and, possibly, those who seek to manipulate the outcome of elections.
The stakes are high. Ms. Martin said this week she would refuse to certify any election here that is counted by a computer and not followed with an expensive post-election audit thorough enough to detect problems. It could come to just such a showdown if the state insists that all municipalities count votes electronically.
This isn't a partisan issue. Republicans, Democrats, independents and minor party voters all have a stake in knowing their votes have been counted. But there is big money in the changeover to electronic voting systems, and politicians have shown a surprising reluctance to admit that the law requiring them is a grave mistake.
The county election commissioners may well become embroiled in legal challenges because of their principled defiance of what amounts to an assault on a basic American right. Fighting any such challenge in court could prove costly for taxpayers. But the price we'll pay if our votes don't count will be much, much higher.
______________________________________
New gear aids voting
By DEBORA GILBERT
The Columbia Paper
HUDSON
This fall's election will mark the second year that Columbia County voters will have a choice of voting machines: the traditional lever machine, possibly in use for the last time, or the new Image Cast ballot marking device (BMD), which has special features that can help people with disabilities.
The BMD machines are required by the federal Help America Vote Act passed in 2002 and are now available to anyone who wants to use them in every polling site in the state."Every citizen has the right to vote privately and independently," said Columbia County Election Commissioner Virginia Martin (D) at an October 17 training session held for local election inspectors in a large lecture hall at Columbia-Greene Community College. The session was intended to help anticipate and solve potential problems ahead of Election Day.
The first subject at the session was the old lever machines. If a voter goes inside the booth, looks at the choices, and decides not to vote, the machine needs to be reset by an inspector, who should know to pull a hidden lever.
"That is the most asked question. We get calls more for that than not," said county Election Commissioner Don Kline (R). "Call the Board of Elections if problems arise. We have more phone lines now," said Ms. Martin, who received gentle applause and murmurs of appreciation from the audience.
Next, Ms. Martin introduced consultant Susan Cohen, who was hired by the Board of Elections "to help us meet our HAVA obligations and to do the right thing for people with disabilities." HAVA is the acronym for the Help America Vote Act. In hiring Ms. Cohen, who has expertise in voting issues and 20 years of experience working with and advocating for persons with disabilities, the county may have placed itself far ahead of the pack in reaching out to voters who may need the accessible voting devices. Ms. Cohen's fee of around $16,000 will be paid by HAVA education funds from the state.
Ms. Cohen has advocated for persons with disabilities at voting act hearings and state election commission meetings. She recently worked as a consultant for Dominion, the manufacturer of the BMD used in this county, providing feedback from voters with disabilities to help the company improve the way the machines work. During the process, engineers were able to reduce the time sight impaired people needed to mark a ballot from 40 minutes to 10.
As a child, the Albany native says she hung out at the Capitol and nearby government buildings just for fun (her family lived nearby). She became fascinated with the legislative process, and developed a lifetime interest in politics. Among her accomplishments is a training program she developed for people with disabilities that helped more than a dozen become board members for organizations that serve their needs.
"Empowerment is the thread of all the projects I've been involved in helping people have a voice," said Ms. Cohen in a phone conversation last week.
At the Saturday meeting, Ms. Cohen advised election personnel of a poster that will hang at every polling place reminding people of the BMD option. "If you don't know it's an option, you won't know to ask for it," she said. She also briefed inspectors on how to work with people who have disabilities, alerting them to a step by step picture book available to inspectors and voters alike that explains without words how to use the new machine.
Her ideas for helping people with disabilities vote extend beyond the polling place itself to include transportation. "If people can't get to the polling places, we'll still have a low turnout," she said. Columbia County is the first county to benefit from Ms. Cohen's services. During this process here, she said, she is fine tuning her plan, which she will offer in the future to other counties.
As part of her work for the county, she ran a outreach program at COARC, where voters were able to practice voting on a BMDs, an exercise she called very successful. "We need to build the confidence and comfort level of disabled voters, and to increase poll workers' comfort in assisting people with disabilities," she said.
"I took two training courses, but this is Greek to me," said one election inspector who still sounded unsure of the new technology. But poll workers were told that 22 poll site specialists trained in how to use the new machines will be on hand Election Day, most serving only two polling places, and some just one.
"This is not your VCR," said Richard Washburn a technician with the Board of Elections. It's actually very easy to use. It's designed to make voting accessible to everyone." In a word of encouragement to election inspectors, Ms. Cohen advised, "Don't let this spook you. It will go a lot smoother than you are imagining."
Ms. Martin was profuse in her thanks to the election inspectors. "You are really important. You are the reason we are able to have elections at all, she said. To be an election inspector, one must be a resident of Columbia County a registered voter here, speak English, and not be running for office or relative of any district candidate.
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Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2009 14:46:08 -0400
Subject: TIMELY Update re: Preserving New York's Voting System - requires your response
From: Andi Novick
Dear County Executives, Legislators and Supervisors:
After many resolutions, meetings and efforts urging the State to take action to prevent the unconstitutional, unfunded and unsecurable voting system mandated by ERMA, we recognize that only litigation can save New York from the fate of the rest of the nation: the burden of unaffordable and unreliable software-based election systems.
It looks like we are closing in on securing the pro bono services of a law firm to commence the litigation to stop ERMA. When that happens, we will have to move quickly.
If your county or county board of elections wishes to participate as plaintiffs in this litigation, please consider what you require in order to obtain formal approval to join the litigation.
We are not asking for a financial commitment at this point as we are hoping to secure the maximum amount of pro bono services we can. We are asking what you can do now, should you choose to participate in the litigation, so that your county would be ready to proceed quickly once we've gotten a commitment from a firm.
Our website has been updated!
In response to questions you've asked us, we've added a new "Did you know" section to our website at
Did you know...?
The litigation will seek to enforce our existing constitutional precedence, which has already held ERMA's method of vote counting to be a
Unfortunately under ERMA, the unreliable software-generated results will remain unreliable. A widely held misconception that a manual count of 3% of the ballots after election night will verify the computer's accuracy, is false (see:
ERMA's audit procedures create a dangerous illusion of verification and will also serve to bar any further review of the ballots. Election officials will be required to certify the accuracy of election results based on factors unverifiable by you or by them. Deprived of your right as candidates, to observe (or have your representatives witness) these critical steps of the election, you will not have the evidence you need to either accept or challenge the accuracy of the results.
The recent resolution passed by NYSAC understandably resists the costly labor-intensive manual counts, but the solution of limiting audits is misplaced. Reducing the amount of audits can only increase the likelihood that an erroneous software result will be confirmed, leaving the 'losing' candidate with no evidence and no remedy. Moreover, containing the audits will not put a dent in the underlying problem, as accurately described in another NYSAC resolution, to wit - the "exorbitant" "unsustainable new burden" to "maintain the demands of the optical scan voting machines." Across the nation we see price gouging by the less than a handful of vendors. Free of competition, they are free to exploit a county's dependence once the system's been purchased. These are the uncontrollable expenses that can bankrupt a county: none of which will be alleviated by limiting the 3% audit. The solution to the problem is to eliminate the need for post-election night hand counts and dependence on costly vote-counting computers, by keeping our secure reliable lever machines.
If you haven't yet watched our short video, It's Time to Take a Stand for Democracy,
We sincerely applaud Commissioner Kellner for his integrity and we understand he is not alone. State Elections Commissioner Peterson has said, in comparing the levers to the scanners: "If you have something that works and something that doesn't work, I vote for the thing that works."
There is nothing more important to a democracy than the integrity of its voting system. The focus on whether your county received sufficient funds to purchase initial equipment pales in comparison to the ongoing expense and uncertainty that will leave us longing for our levers, after it's too late. Our lever machines are affordable to maintain and produce a reliable accurate count on election night; the results of which have already been verified at every juncture by election officials and observers. They don't require subsequent hand counts to try to compensate for the machines' vulnerability to indiscernible erroneous results. Invisible manipulation, vote switching and systematic exploits are not possible with our technologically superior lever machines.
HAVA set minimum standards for elections. Having satisfied HAVA with ballot marking devices in every poll site to accommodate the disabled, we have the right and the duty to insist on our higher standards which facilitate our ability to determine our elections with certainty and integrity, and without the unaffordable expense of the substandard, unworthy vote-counting computers.
We hope you will consider participating in the litigation so we can make a strong showing in court. Please contact me as soon as possible with details about the next steps in your county for securing participation in the upcoming litigation.
Thank you,
Andrea Novick, Esq.
Founder and Legal Counsel, the Election Transparency Coalition
Direct Line: 845 876 2359
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From: Andinovick@aol.com
Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2009 13:59:58 EDT
Subject: Must watch Video: State Makes Best Case for NY's Existing Voting System!
Dear friends,
I write to bring you up to date on the activities of the Election Transparency Coalition (ETC) to keep our safe transparent lever voting machines in New York State. If you have time for nothing else, please watch and circulate this short video, "It's Time to Take a Stand for our Democracy" at: http://nylevers.wordpress.com/
Since you last heard from us we have been working very hard:
* We wrote letters to all the county legislatures and executives, providing them with the information they weren't otherwise receiving and encouraging them to pass resolutions in support of retaining our secure and transparent lever voting system. We currently have resolutions from 20 counties plus Nassau and Suffolk are in support of retaining levers, but can't pass this type of "sense of" resolution.
* We also have similar resolutions from various unions, political clubs and other organizations; see the list at the site, http://nylevers.wordpress.com/.
* We placed articles in dozens of newspapers throughout the state about the need to resist unconstitutional legislation forcing us to surrender our observable, fraud-deterring lever system for concealed, fraud-enabling computers.
* After participating in a public forum with Commissioner Kellner and author Mark Crispin Miller, we made the video referenced above in order to publicize the issue more widely.
* We became a project of the International Humanities Center, a 501(c )(3) organization, so that ETC can receive tax-deductible contributions to continue this fight.
* We received a Statement of Support from national Election Integrity experts, see ETCNYS.org, in which they wrote:
"We consider the New York litigation to be one of the best opportunities the nation has for serious judicial consideration of the constitutional implications of concealed vote counting."
* We created a new website, NYLEVERS.nylevers.wordpress.com/, to compliment our blog, ETCNYS.org. The site provides current information regarding the resolutions and what you can do to help our efforts. Feel free to use the comparison chart between levers and scanners, http://nylevers.wordpress.com/chart/ as a handout and as a general reference piece.
* We went to conferences and meetings to create relationships with our county governments and county boards of election.
* We went to public hearings to present our case against vote counting by secretly programmed, exploitable computers.
* We worked with others preparing comprehensive cost reports to demonstrate the steep costs that will fall on the counties once the conversion to computerized vote-counting systems is made.
* We have over 2,000 signatures on a citizen petition and recently created a new site to make signing the petition easier.
* We prepared litigation to have ERMA declared unconstitutional.
* We reached out to law firms in New York State, inviting participation in this suit since a suit of this magnitude requires more legal resources than one attorney can handle alone.
* We have reached out to experts we know in the field and have found many willing to testify at a trial, if necessary.
* We continue to publish articles, the latest one that sums it all up is "Nullifying the Consent of the Governed": http://www.opednews.com/articles/New-York-s-New-Voting-Syst-by-andi-novick-090718-710.html
Where things stand:
* We have run out of money.
* It has been very difficult to find a law firm that can afford to take this case on a pro bono basis, although a number of firms are considering making that sacrifice. Even if they are willing to provide legal services on a pro bono basis, there are other expenses of litigation that will need to be covered.
What we need:
* Legal help
* Donations:
* 10,000 more names on the petition. We created a new petition site because so many people had technical difficulties with the old site. Please sign this petition:http://www.petitiononline.com/etcnysls/petition.html
(we'll worry about duplicates so don't worry if you can't recall if you signed the earlier petition) and circulate this petition widely. A third of the counties have passed resolutions and many other counties are in favor of retaining the levers even if they haven't passed a resolution. We should have equal representation amongst our citizens. Go to: http://www.petitiononline.com/etcnysls/petition.html
Thank you all. Let's keep this alive and get into court. This is absolutely crunch time. Please contribute and help NOW.
Also please watch the video, IT'S TIME TO TAKE A STAND FOR OUR DEMOCRACY, at - http://nylevers.wordpress.com/ - and forward it to others.
Andi Novick
The Election Transparency Coalition
NYLEVERS.nylevers.wordpress.com/
ETCNYS.org
More people have been elected between sundown and sunup than ever were elected between sunup and sundown. Will Rogers
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Computer scientists agree: software-based election systems cannot be made secure from undetectable manipulation or error
http://nylevers.wordpress.com/chart/resources-background-links/faqs/computer-scientists-agree-software-based-election-systems-cannot-be-made-secure-from-undetectable-manipulation-or-error/
Since 2002, when HAVA was enacted, computer scientists have released over three dozen studies of the software-based voting systems rushed in by HAVA. Every one of these studies has concluded that software-based optical scanners and DREs (direct record electronic systems, often known as "touch screens") are vulnerable to undetectable manipulation and error. While any machine, including a lever voting machine, can be hacked, software enables a single individual to change thousands of votes in a few minutes without leaving a trace.
The inner workings of the software-based machine are invisible. Systematic exploits enable massive vote switching in minutes. In contrast, to affect the outcome of an election conducted with lever machines is labor-intensive since each machine must be individually rigged, increasing the likelihood that the crime would be caught; levers are not capable of systematic exploits. Vote flipping, common on electronic machines, is also not possible on a lever machine. Tampering to a lever machine can be detected because the working parts of the lever machine are visible, as contrasted with software, which is invisible to all but the programmers. Regardless of how the software has been programmed, self-erasing malware can be introduced into an electronic system but not into a lever system. Certification of computerized systems is a ruse because no amount of certification testing will make voting computers secure.
* The National Institute of Standards and Technology, the Federal government's own technical advisers, found that certification testing cannot provide security or reliability:
[E]xperience in testing software and systems has shown that testing to high degrees of security and reliability is from a practical perspective not possible." (Emphas
* A 2007 report authorized by the California Secretary of State found that with software-based voting machines:
An attack could plausibly be accomplished by a single skilled individual with temporary access to a single voting machine. The damage could be extensive - malicious code could spread to every voting machine in polling places and to county election servers.
* Finding error or fraud in software code has been shown to be prohibitively expensive and time-consuming due to self-erasing code and the fact that code can be several hundred thousand lines in length, according to the 2008 ACCURATE Report (A Center for Correct, Usable, Reliable, Auditable, and Transparent Elections):
[N]o matter how hard one looks for errors or faults in voting system software, there is no way to guarantee that one has found them all. Even if no errors or faults are found, there is no way to guarantee that none exist….
* Notwithstanding the pre-election certification of the optical scanners and even with security seals in place, in 2006 the University of Connecticut established how easily election results can be falsified on an optical scanner:
An Accu-Vote Optical Scan can be compromised with off-the-shelf equipment in a matter of minutes even if the machine has its removable memory card sealed in place. The basic attack can be applied to effect a variety of results, including entirely neutralizing one candidate so that their votes are not counted, swapping the votes of two candidates, or biasing the results by shifting some votes from one candidate to another….
Such vote tabulation corruptions can lay dormant until Election Day, thus avoiding detection through pre-election tests…. [V]oters could be unaware of any discrepancies between their cast votes and the internally recorded votes.
* A 2007 Florida report demonstrated how viruses can be introduced and propagated from a single machine to every other computer in the jurisdiction as well as from one election to the next. Each county will use an Election Management System (EMS) computer (commonly known as a "central tabulator"). The central tabulator reprograms the optical scanners before every election using a memory card that tells the machine who is on the ballot and how to count it, and then accumulates and reports precinct-level results after an election. Florida's study demonstrated how a virus introduced to a single machine would spread to every other machine in the county via memory cards:
A cleverly constructed virus can cover its tracks so that infected machines could not be detected by ordinary means and an appropriately programmed virus could self-destruct and erase all its tracks…. [I]f carefully constructed, it can allow an attacker to transfer program control to her own malicious code. Once this happens, the attacker controls the machine.
* A 2006 Princeton University report "describes how the virus propagates … via memory cards, without requiring any network." NY's wireless ban would not prevent this massive attack because all computers in a county communicate with the EMS central tabulator, which in turn communicates with each computer in the county:
An infected machine will infect any memory card that is inserted into it. An infected memory card will infect any machine that is powered up or rebooted with the memory card inserted. Because cards are transferred between machines during vote counting and administrative activities, the infected population will grow over time.
* A 2006 report commissioned by California's Secretary of State corroborated that these attacks to optical scanners cannot be discerned by election officials responsible for ensuring the accuracy of the election:
There would be no way to know that any of these attacks occurred; the canvass procedure would not detect any anomalies, and would just produce incorrect results. The only way to detect and correct the problem would be by recount of the original paper ballots.
* A 2007 report commissioned by Florida's Secretary of State reaffirmed that election results could be readily compromised by an individual with only brief access to an optical scanner, by replacing the memory card with one preprogrammed to read one candidate's votes as counting for another. The report also found "The attack can be carried out with a reasonably low probability of detection…."
Flaws in the Optical Scan software enable an unofficial memory card to be inserted into an active terminal. Such a card can be preprogrammed to swap the electronically tabulated votes for two candidates, reroute all of a candidate's votes to a different candidate, or tabulate votes for several candidates of choice toward a different candidate.
* In 2007, Ohio's Secretary of State released the Evaluation and Validation of Election Related Equipment, Standards and Testing (EVEREST) study, which revealed, among other things, the ineffectiveness of requirements -such as NY's - that the source code be escrowed to secure the software. The EVEREST team was able to penetrate all of Ohio's voting systems, including Sequoia's optical scanner, without the source code. None of these attacks could have been detected or prevented by knowing the source code. The EVEREST report concluded that software-based systems are "insufficient to guarantee a trustworthy election."
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